When Iran fired more than 500 ballistic missiles at Israel over 12 days in June 2025, the United States burned through approximately 100 to 150 THAAD interceptors — roughly a quarter of its entire national stockpile — in less than a fortnight. Each interceptor costs $12.7 million, according to the 2025 Missile Defense Agency budget. CNN The Lockheed Martin production line builds fewer than 40 of them in an average fiscal year. That arithmetic alone tells you more about the state of modern missile warfare than any strategic doctrine paper published in the past decade.
What you are watching unfold across the Middle East is not simply a bilateral conflict between Israel and Iran. It is the most intensive real-world test of layered missile defense and offensive ballistic missile strategy since the Gulf War, and the data it is generating is reshaping military planning in Washington, Tel Aviv, Beijing, and Moscow simultaneously. The weapons on both sides of this exchange are not theoretical. They have been fired, tracked, intercepted, and in some cases, they have struck hospitals, apartment buildings, military airfields, and nuclear research facilities. Their performance in combat — not lab conditions — is what matters now.
How the Conflict Built to This Point
You cannot understand the missile systems in play without a clear timeline of how this escalation unfolded.
In April 2024, Iran launched its first-ever direct attack on Israeli territory — Operation True Promise I — sending drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles in retaliation for an Israeli airstrike on Iran’s consulate in Damascus that killed two IRGC generals. Israel, with support from the US, UK, France, and Jordan, intercepted the overwhelming majority of incoming weapons. The result was militarily modest but historically significant: state-on-state ballistic missile exchange in the Middle East, direct, no longer deniable.
On 1 October 2024, Iran launched about 200 ballistic missiles at targets in Israel in at least two waves, in what became the largest attack during the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict. Iran’s codename for the attack was Operation True Promise II. Wikipedia This time, Tehran applied a different doctrine. Rather than mixing drones and cruise missiles to complicate defense layers, Iran sent a concentrated, rapid ballistic salvo designed to oversaturate radar tracking and exhaust interceptor inventory. The missiles caused minor damage to Nevatim Airbase in southern Israel, which remained operational. Wikipedia
The latter Israeli strikes in October 2024 destroyed nearly all of Iran’s Russian-supplied defensive S-300 missile systems, paving the way for potential future Israeli strikes. Wikipedia That single fact — the destruction of Iran’s primary defensive shield — made the June 2025 Twelve-Day War not only possible but structurally inevitable. Once Iran’s skies were effectively open to Israeli aircraft, the strategic pressure to act before Iran acquired nuclear capability became overwhelming for the Netanyahu government.
The Twelve-Day War was an armed conflict between Iran and Israel which lasted from 13 to 24 June 2025. It began when Israel bombed military and nuclear facilities in Iran in a surprise attack, assassinating prominent military leaders, nuclear scientists, and politicians. Iran retaliated with over 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 suicide drones, hitting civilian population centers, one hospital and at least twelve military, energy, and government sites. Wikipedia A ceasefire brokered under US pressure came on 24 June. On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States began a series of strikes against Iran targeting the country’s leadership, security forces, nuclear programme, and missile sites, saying they aimed to induce regime change in Iran. House of Commons Library
Iran’s Offensive Arsenal: What It Fires, and Why It Works
Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is estimated to include over 3,000 missiles in a normal state, comprising a diverse array of short-range ballistic missiles with a range of 300–1,000 km, and medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,000–3,000 km. Iran Watch Following the losses of 2024 and 2025, Israeli officials estimated Iran retained approximately 1,500 missiles at the ceasefire’s end. Iran intensified efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program following the losses it sustained during the 2025 Iran-Israel war and is reported to have replenished its stockpile to approximately 2,000 missiles. Wikipedia
Understanding Iran’s arsenal requires separating the weapons into functional tiers, because Tehran deliberately mixes them in operational salvos to complicate defense targeting.
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (150–800 km)
Short-range ballistic missiles are built for nearby military targets and rapid regional strikes. Core systems include the Fateh variants: Zolfaghar, Qiam-1, and older Shahab-1/2 missiles. Al Jazeera These are the weapons Iran reaches for when it wants to strike nearby military targets fast. They hit Ain al-Assad airbase in Iraq in January 2020 following the killing of Qassem Soleimani, injuring more than 100 US military personnel with traumatic brain injuries, demonstrating that Iran could inflict high costs without matching US air power.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,500–2,000 km)
This is the tier that places Israel, Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase, Bahrain’s Naval Support Activity, and US positions across the Gulf all within reach. Systems such as Shahab-3, Emad, Ghadr-1, the Khorramshahr variants, and Sejjil underpin Iran’s ability to hit further afield, alongside newer designs like Kheibar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Taken together, these medium-range missiles place Israel and a wide arc of US-linked facilities in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates within range, widening both Iran’s target list and the region’s exposure. Al Jazeera
Among these, the Kheibar Shekan deserves particular attention. The Kheibar Shekan missile is 11.4 meters long, 76 centimeters in diameter, and weighs 6.3 tons with a 550-kilogram warhead. It has the ability to hit targets within a range of 1,450 kilometers. Wikipedia What makes it operationally distinct is not its range alone — it is the combination of a maneuverable reentry vehicle with a tri-conic warhead design that shifts its terminal trajectory to complicate intercept geometry. The launcher used for the missile is mounted on a 10-wheel commercial chassis that can also be camouflaged as a commercial vehicle. Wikipedia That mobility drastically compresses the window available for pre-launch targeting. Kheibar Shekan missiles were identified in Iran’s October 2024 salvo against Israel and featured prominently in the June 2025 barrages.
Sejjil stands out as a solid-fuel system, generally allowing faster launch readiness than liquid-fuel missiles — an advantage if Iran expects incoming strikes and needs survivable, responsive options. Al Jazeera A solid-fuel MRBM can be maintained in a state of near-instantaneous readiness inside a hardened facility and fired in minutes. Iran’s post-2015 focus on solid propellants directly reflects lessons drawn from watching the US and Israel target slow-to-launch systems.
The Fattah Program: Maneuvering Reentry, Not True Hypersonic
Iran has branded the Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 as hypersonic missiles, claiming speeds of Mach 13 to Mach 15 and ranges of 1,400 to 1,500 km. The actual technical picture is more nuanced, and more instructive. According to Fabian Hinz, research fellow for Defense and Military Analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Fattah does not fall under the general classification of hypersonic weapons, but is rather a medium-range ballistic missile that has a second stage incorporating the warhead, aerodynamic controls and a small solid-propellant motor with a moveable nozzle for thrust vector control that resembles a maneuverable reentry vehicle, meaning it can only maneuver for a short part of the flight in the terminal phase. Wikipedia
That is distinct from true hypersonic glide, but it is not trivial. The powered terminal maneuvering adds trajectory unpredictability in the final phase of flight, which is precisely when interceptors engage. Debris identified by researchers from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies confirmed Fattah-1 debris from both the 1 October 2024 strikes as well as the April 2024 Iranian strikes against Israel. Wikipedia
Shahed Drones: The Economy-of-Force Weapon
No analysis of Iran’s offensive capability is complete without the Shahed-136 and its variants. These are one-way attack drones — effectively cheap, propeller-driven cruise missiles with a roughly 50 kg warhead. Against them, Israel’s Iron Dome fires interceptors costing around $80,000 per shot. Iran sent over 1,000 suicide drones during the Twelve-Day War. Wikipedia The math is deliberately asymmetric. Shahed drones do not individually threaten hardened military targets, but in mass launches coordinated with fast ballistic missiles, they force defenders to split radar tracking, exhaust interceptors in mixed engagements, and make triage decisions under time pressure.
Israel’s Layered Defense: Architecture and Performance Under Fire
During the June 2025 twelve-day escalation, Iron Dome, together with Israel’s multi-layered missile defense system including David’s Sling, Arrow 3, Barak, and Iron Beam, intercepted approximately 86–90 percent of incoming threats. AJC That figure sounds impressive until you account for what 10 to 14 percent penetration means when hundreds of missiles are incoming.
Iron Dome
The Iron Dome was not designed for this fight. It handles short-range rockets and drones from 4 to 70 km, specifically the unguided projectile threats from Hamas and Hezbollah that have characterized years of low-intensity conflict. Each Iron Dome interception costs around $50,000. Wionews Against ballistic missile salvos from Iran, Iron Dome plays a supporting role — clearing the low-altitude drone and short-range rocket threats, freeing upper-tier systems for the ballistic threats.
In September 2025, Israel announced the completion of the Iron Beam defensive system, which works alongside the Iron Dome to protect Israeli civilians. Amid the war against the Iranian regime in March 2026, the system was reportedly used operationally for the first time against rockets launched by Iran-backed Hezbollah from Lebanon. AJC
David’s Sling
David’s Sling, jointly developed by Rafael and Raytheon and operational since 2017, covers the gap between Iron Dome and the Arrow system. David’s Sling, developed and manufactured by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, serves as the middle tier of Israel’s multi-layered missile defense architecture. It is designed to intercept threats at ranges of up to approximately 300 kilometers. Calcali Tech David’s Sling shot down a ballistic missile for the first time in June 2025, during the Iran-Israel War. Wikipedia
Israel’s defense industry has accelerated its own interceptor production, with defense sources reporting that the production rate of Arrow 3 interceptors at Israel Aerospace Industries has tripled compared with prewar levels. Two major contracts to supply Arrow 3 systems to Germany, valued at approximately $6.5 billion, have supported the expansion of production infrastructure. Calcali Tech
Arrow 2 and Arrow 3
Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 form the top tier of Israel’s theater defense. Arrow 2 handles endo-atmospheric engagements against short-to-medium range ballistic missiles. Arrow 3 is Israel’s top-tier interceptor, capable of destroying long-range ballistic missiles outside the Earth’s atmosphere. With a range of up to 2,400 kilometres, it neutralises threats safely in space, preventing any non-conventional warheads from causing damage on the ground. Wionews Following the Twelve-Day War, Israel immediately contracted for significantly accelerated Arrow production, with IAI President Boaz Levy describing the move as reflecting “unprecedented success during the war.”
The American Factor: THAAD, SM-3, and the Stockpile Crisis
The US contribution to Israeli missile defense during the June 2025 war was decisive and alarming in equal measure. The US 6th Fleet stationed five Arleigh Burke class destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to assist with Israeli missile defense and disrupt Iranian air strikes. Wikipedia Two THAAD batteries were already in place following deployment decisions made after October 2024.
US forces countered Tehran’s barrage of ballistic missiles by firing more than 100 THAAD interceptors — and possibly as many as 150 — a significant portion of America’s stockpile. The US has seven THAAD systems and used two of them in Israel in the conflict. CNN THAAD production has fluctuated from over 100 interceptors in 2019 to 11 in 2024, yet the expenditure rate in the June 2025 conflict exceeds even the most aggressive production rate by 50 percent. Foreign Policy Research Institute
Former senior defense officials warned that stockpile concerns preceded the twelve-day war. “Stockpiles are dropping. We need more. We need them faster than they are being built,” said one former defense official. “Air defense is relevant in all of the major theaters right now. And there’s not enough systems,” added a former senior Biden defense official. CNN
That gap is not simply a logistics problem. It is a strategic vulnerability with direct implications for US deterrence posture against China in the Pacific, where the same depleted interceptor supply chain underpins the entire regional defense architecture.
Iran’s Counter-Response: Missile Cities, Dispersal, and Saturation Doctrine
Iran has adapted its operational doctrine directly from the defeats and intelligence assessments of 2024 and 2025. Iran’s current military strategy is to survive intense Israeli-US pressure, rebuild its core capabilities, and restore deterrence by calibrated asymmetric escalation through missiles, drones, and proxies. The strategy firstly focuses on hardening “missile cities,” dispersing command structures, and accepting initial damage in order to preserve a second-strike capability. Al Jazeera
In February 2025, a ship carrying 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a chemical crucial for solid propellant production in missiles, arrived at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. This shipment could facilitate the production of propellant for about 260 Kheibar Shekan missiles or around 200 Martyr Hajj Qassem Soleimani ballistic missiles. Wikipedia
Iran increasingly employed more advanced systems during the June 2025 war, including newer missiles with multiple warheads or decoys, which may individually cause less damage but can overwhelm and saturate air defense systems, CNN according to Mora Deitch, head of the data analytics center at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. In the opening exchanges of March 2026, Iran fired 137 missiles and 209 drones across the UAE, where US military bases are present, with fires and smoke reaching Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah and Burj Al Arab. Al Jazeera
What Comes Next: Arrow 4, Iron Beam, and the Race That Doesn’t End
The technology on both sides is moving faster than the diplomacy.
Arrow 4 is being designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere and exo-atmospherically, providing a strategic layer above the capabilities of Arrow 3. Germany plans to integrate Arrow 4 into the existing Arrow 3 infrastructure, including shared launchers and radar systems, to reduce procurement costs. Initial deliveries are expected after 2030. Wikipedia
Iran’s sense of urgency in rebuilding its missile arsenal reflects the heavy investment its rulers have made in the country’s missile capabilities over the past two decades, focused on improving combat-readiness, precision, and accuracy to make them a potent conventional deterrent. Following the poor performance of some of its missiles against US and Israeli air defenses in 2024–2025, Iran has also sought to improve the maneuverability of its warheads. Iran Watch
In the first three days of the March 2026 war, Iran launched more than 200 ballistic missiles at Israel. To put that into context, during the 12-day war, they launched around 500, each requiring that Israel counter by launching an interceptor rocket. Without US help, Israel would probably have lost control of its airspace by now, Al Jazeera according to one analyst cited by Al Jazeera.
What the past 18 months of direct conflict have demonstrated is that no missile defense system — however sophisticated, however layered, however generously funded — provides anything close to a complete guarantee. Defence analysts say Iran can likely sustain intermittent missile, drone, proxy, and cyber operations for years because these systems are relatively cheap and can be produced and deployed from dispersed, hardened facilities, even under sanctions. Al Jazeera
The question you should be asking is not whether the current missile defense architecture is impressive — it is. The question is whether the production rates, stockpile levels, and technological development timelines on the defensive side can keep pace with Iran’s documented capacity for rapid industrial recovery, doctrinal adaptation, and missile proliferation across its regional proxy network. The evidence from June 2025 to March 2026 suggests that gap is narrowing faster than Western defense planners publicly acknowledge.
References
Twelve-Day War (Iran-Israel War) — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_war
2026 Iran Conflict — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_conflict
US-Israel Strikes on Iran: February/March 2026 — UK House of Commons Library https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10521/
What Are Iran’s Weapons as It Fights the US and Israel? — Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/what-are-irans-weapons-as-it-fights-the-us-and-israel
Shallow Ramparts: Air and Missile Defenses in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War — Foreign Policy Research Institute https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/10/shallow-ramparts-air-and-missile-defenses-in-the-june-2025-israel-iran-war/
October 2024 Iranian Strikes on Israel — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_2024_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel
Iran’s War With Israel and the United States — CFR Global Conflict Tracker https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran
How Long Can Israel Sustain a Military Conflict With Iran? — Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/how-long-can-israel-sustain-a-military-conflict-with-iran
US Used About a Quarter of Its High-End Missile Interceptors During Israel-Iran War — CNN https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/28/middleeast/us-thaad-missile-interceptor-shortage-intl-invs
7 Things You Need to Know About Israel’s Iron Dome Defense System — AJC https://www.ajc.org/news/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-israels-iron-dome-defense-system
Israel Moves to Significantly Accelerate Acquisition of More Arrow Interceptors — Breaking Defense https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/israel-moves-to-significantly-accelerate-acquisition-of-more-arrow-interceptors/
Israel Quietly Upgraded a Critical Missile Defense Layer Before War With Iran Erupted — Calcalist Tech https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/byl5e8zk11l
Ballistic Missile Program of Iran — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran’s_ballistic-missile_program
Fattah-1 — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fattah-1
Kheibar Shekan — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kheibar_Shekan
Table of Iran’s Missile Arsenal — Iran Watch https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/table-irans-missile-arsenal
1,500 Missiles Ready: Iran’s Rebuilt Arsenal Is a Threat to the US Military and Israel — 19FortyFive https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/02/1500-missiles-ready-irans-rebuilt-arsenal-is-a-threat-to-the-u-s-military-and-israel/
What Is Iran’s Military Strategy? How Has It Changed Since June 2025 War? — Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/what-is-irans-military-strategy-how-it-has-changed-since-june-2025-war
A Brief Guide to Iranian Ballistic Missiles — Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) https://aoav.org.uk/2025/a-brief-guide-to-iranian-ballistic-missiles/
Arrow Missile Family — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow_(missile_family)
David’s Sling — Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David’s_Sling
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