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What Iran Could Do Next: 5 Strategic Responses to a U.S. Strike on Its Nuclear Facilities

What Iran Could Do Next: 5 Strategic Responses to a U.S. Strike on Its Nuclear Facilities

What Iran Could Do Next: 5 Strategic Responses to a U.S. Strike on Its Nuclear Facilities

&Tab;&Tab;<div class&equals;"wpcnt">&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;<div class&equals;"wpa">&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;<span class&equals;"wpa-about">Advertisements<&sol;span>&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;<div class&equals;"u top&lowbar;amp">&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;<amp-ad width&equals;"300" height&equals;"265"&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab; type&equals;"pubmine"&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab; data-siteid&equals;"173035871"&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab; data-section&equals;"1">&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;<&sol;amp-ad>&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;<&sol;div>&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;&Tab;<&sol;div>&NewLine;&Tab;&Tab;<&sol;div>&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">After a U&period;S&period; bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities&comma; the international system wouldn’t simply wait to see what happens next—it would brace for impact&period; The U&period;S&period; would have triggered not just a military action&comma; but a chain reaction across the Middle East and beyond&period; Iran’s potential counter-responses would be calculated&comma; asymmetrical&comma; and likely span military&comma; cyber&comma; economic&comma; and political arenas&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">If you’re assessing what comes next&comma; don’t look only at the missiles or speeches—follow the energy markets&comma; militia movements&comma; digital disruption&comma; and backdoor diplomacy&period; Tehran is unlikely to rely on a single track&period; Instead&comma; it would likely engage in a multi-pronged playbook designed to regain leverage&comma; deter further aggression&comma; and build strategic capital&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">Below are five realistic paths Iran could take—and how it could execute them&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">1&period; Escalation Through Proxy Forces<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Iran Could Do&colon;<&sol;strong><br>Iran has long avoided direct confrontation by using proxy groups to carry out attacks while maintaining plausible deniability&period; After a U&period;S&period; strike&comma; Tehran could unleash or greenlight a wave of proxy operations across the region targeting U&period;S&period; forces&comma; allies&comma; and infrastructure&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Execution Mechanism&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li><strong>Hezbollah in Lebanon<&sol;strong>&colon; Tehran could order Hezbollah to fire rockets into Israel&comma; reigniting a northern front conflict that stretches Israeli defense resources&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>Houthis in Yemen<&sol;strong>&colon; The Houthis&comma; already aligned with Iran&comma; could increase drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia and UAE oil facilities—targeting energy infrastructure critical to global supply&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>Shia militias in Iraq and Syria<&sol;strong>&colon; Groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah or Harakat al-Nujaba may attack U&period;S&period; bases in Iraq&comma; using drones or roadside bombs &lpar;IEDs&rpar;&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Precedents&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>In 2020&comma; after the killing of Qassem Soleimani&comma; Iran-backed militias increased attacks on U&period;S&period; troops in Iraq&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Between 2019–2022&comma; the Houthis carried out over 1&comma;000 drone and missile strikes against Saudi targets&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implication for the Region&colon;<&sol;strong><br>A regional proxy war would complicate U&period;S&period; military logistics&comma; drag neighboring states into the conflict&comma; and potentially lead to a broader Israel-Iran confrontation&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">2&period; Mining the Strait of Hormuz<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Iran Could Do&colon;<&sol;strong><br>Iran controls the northern coastline of the Strait of Hormuz—a chokepoint through which roughly 20&percnt; of global oil passes&period; Tehran could disrupt or block commercial shipping&comma; especially oil tankers bound for Western and Asian markets&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Execution Mechanism&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>Deploying naval mines&comma; fast attack boats&comma; and drone boats&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Harassing or boarding commercial ships with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy &lpar;IRGCN&rpar;&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Using anti-ship missiles deployed from coastal batteries&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Precedents&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>In 2019&comma; Iran was blamed for limpet mine attacks on tankers near Fujairah&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>The 1980s &OpenCurlyDoubleQuote;Tanker War” during the Iran-Iraq War led to the mining of Gulf waters&comma; prompting Operation Earnest Will by the U&period;S&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Impact on Global Markets&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>A disruption in Hormuz could spike oil prices above &dollar;120 per barrel within days&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Insurance premiums for shipping in the Gulf would skyrocket&comma; reducing tanker availability and slowing delivery times&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Strategic Leverage&colon;<&sol;strong><br>Iran doesn&&num;8217&semi;t need to close the Strait entirely&semi; merely threatening it injects enough volatility to force diplomatic attention and give it bargaining power&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">3&period; Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Iran Could Do&colon;<&sol;strong><br>Tehran has developed a strong cyber warfare capability and may use it to retaliate by targeting U&period;S&period; financial institutions&comma; energy grids&comma; or government infrastructure&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Execution Mechanism&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>Targeting banks&comma; credit systems&comma; or payment networks to cause financial panic&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Attacks on U&period;S&period; water treatment facilities or power grids&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Cyber espionage to leak sensitive information or embarrass policymakers&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Precedents&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>The 2012–2013 &OpenCurlyDoubleQuote;Shamoon” attacks took down Aramco’s IT systems&comma; deleting 30&comma;000 hard drives&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>In 2021&comma; the Boston Children’s Hospital reported a thwarted Iranian cyberattack&comma; described by the FBI as one of the most &&num;8220&semi;despicable&&num;8221&semi; threats&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Operational Players&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>APT33 and APT34&colon; Iranian-linked cyber units believed to be responsible for global espionage and attacks&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Iranian hackers have previously targeted U&period;S&period; dams&comma; casino networks&comma; and even universities for research data&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why This Matters&colon;<&sol;strong><br>Unlike conventional warfare&comma; cyberattacks provide high-impact&comma; low-cost&comma; and deniable options&period; Iran could inflict significant economic and psychological damage without firing a shot&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">4&period; Accelerating the Nuclear Program<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Iran Could Do&colon;<&sol;strong><br>After a physical attack on its nuclear facilities&comma; Iran could retaliate by withdrawing completely from the Non-Proliferation Treaty &lpar;NPT&rpar; and rushing to build a bomb as a deterrent&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Execution Mechanism&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>Restart high-level uranium enrichment &lpar;above 60&percnt;&comma; approaching weapons-grade&rpar;&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Expel International Atomic Energy Agency &lpar;IAEA&rpar; inspectors&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Operate clandestine nuclear facilities in tunnels or protected military zones&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Precedents&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>After the U&period;S&period; exited the JCPOA &lpar;Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action&rpar; in 2018&comma; Iran gradually increased enrichment from 3&period;67&percnt; to over 60&percnt;&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and conducted its first nuclear test three years later&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>International Fallout&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>Israel may launch further strikes to stop weaponization&comma; escalating into direct war&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Russia and China may shield Iran at the UN&comma; complicating sanctions&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Gulf nations might openly consider nuclear capabilities to match Iranian threat&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Strategic Calculation&colon;<&sol;strong><br>Tehran could argue that the U&period;S&period; attack invalidated all prior agreements and that only a nuclear deterrent ensures national sovereignty&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">5&period; Launching Targeted Missile Strikes<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Iran Could Do&colon;<&sol;strong><br>Iran may choose overt retaliation by firing ballistic or cruise missiles at U&period;S&period; bases in Iraq&comma; Syria&comma; or Gulf states like Bahrain and Qatar&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Execution Mechanism&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>Using short-range ballistic missiles &lpar;SRBMs&rpar; like Fateh-110 or Zulfiqar &lpar;300–700 km range&rpar;&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Targeting bases such as Al-Udeid &lpar;Qatar&rpar;&comma; Ayn al-Asad &lpar;Iraq&rpar;&comma; or Al Dhafra &lpar;UAE&rpar;&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Coordinated attacks with drones to overwhelm air defenses&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Precedents&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>January 2020&colon; Iran launched over a dozen missiles at Ayn al-Asad in Iraq in response to Soleimani&&num;8217&semi;s killing&comma; injuring more than 100 U&period;S&period; personnel&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Military Capabilities&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>Iran possesses over 3&comma;000 ballistic missiles&comma; the largest arsenal in the region&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Precision of Iranian missiles has improved&comma; with CEP &lpar;circular error probable&rpar; dropping below 10 meters in some variants&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Risk of Escalation&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li>A direct missile strike could lead to a U&period;S&period; counterstrike&comma; turning a tit-for-tat into full-scale war&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li>Civilian casualties in host countries could shift local populations against U&period;S&period; bases&comma; endangering regional alliances&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">What Determines Iran’s Playbook&quest;<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">Iran&&num;8217&semi;s leadership is highly strategic&period; Its decisions are informed by internal pressures&comma; regional alliances&comma; and global diplomacy&period; Tehran’s response would likely be influenced by the following variables&colon;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li><strong>Domestic sentiment<&sol;strong>&colon; Hardliners may push for escalation&comma; while moderates seek international sympathy&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>Energy leverage<&sol;strong>&colon; Oil disruptions boost Iran’s revenues indirectly by raising global prices&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>Geopolitical backers<&sol;strong>&colon; Russia and China may provide cover at the UN or accelerate arms transfers&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>Upcoming elections<&sol;strong>&colon; Iranian leadership may use retaliation as a rallying point or to suppress dissent&period;<&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">What Should Policymakers and Analysts Be Watching&quest;<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">If you’re tracking what Iran might do next&comma; focus on&colon;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ul class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li><strong>Proxy movements in Iraq&comma; Syria&comma; Lebanon&comma; and Yemen&period;<&sol;strong><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>IRGC naval deployment in the Gulf&period;<&sol;strong><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>State-controlled hacker activity in financial and infrastructure sectors&period;<&sol;strong><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>Uranium enrichment levels reported by the IAEA&period;<&sol;strong><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><strong>Ballistic missile mobilization via satellite imagery&period;<&sol;strong><&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ul>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">Is There a Path to De-escalation&quest;<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">Yes&comma; but it will be narrow and rapidly closing&period; Diplomatic backchannels involving Oman&comma; Switzerland&comma; or Qatar could offer temporary off-ramps&period; Iran might be open to negotiations if it extracts some symbolic or economic concessions&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">But Tehran will not respond passively&period; The risk isn&&num;8217&semi;t just in what Iran chooses—it’s in how the U&period;S&period; and its allies react&period; Overreaction or miscalculation could make containment impossible&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<h3 class&equals;"wp-block-heading">Final Thought<&sol;h3>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph">You should consider one more question&colon; Is the region prepared for another long-term destabilization&comma; with oil markets on fire&comma; cyber threats escalating&comma; and militaries stretched thin across multiple theaters&quest; If not&comma; then every move from this point must be understood not just as military tactics&comma; but as geopolitical chess&period; One wrong move and the board flips&period;<&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<hr class&equals;"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"&sol;>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<p class&equals;"wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Citations&colon;<&sol;strong><&sol;p>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<ol class&equals;"wp-block-list">&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;eia&period;gov&sol;todayinenergy&sol;detail&period;php&quest;id&equals;48756<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;reuters&period;com&sol;world&sol;middle-east&sol;iran-backed-militias-step-up-attacks-us-bases-2023-12-14&sol;<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;carnegieendowment&period;org&sol;2022&sol;01&sol;25&sol;iran-s-proxy-network-in-middle-east-pub-86294<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;brookings&period;edu&sol;articles&sol;the-danger-of-a-spiral-in-the-gulf-if-iran-targets-hormuz&sol;<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;armscontrol&period;org&sol;factsheets&sol;IranNuclearProgram<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;csis&period;org&sol;programs&sol;international-security-program&sol;technology-and-national-security&sol;iranian-cyber-threat<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;rand&period;org&sol;pubs&sol;perspectives&sol;PE342&period;html<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;defense&period;gov&sol;News&sol;News-Stories&sol;Article&sol;Article&sol;2069012&sol;iranian-missile-attack-on-iraqi-base-injured-dozens-of-us-troops&sol;<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;iaea&period;org&sol;newscenter&sol;focus&sol;iran<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;&NewLine;<li><a>https&colon;&sol;&sol;www&period;washingtoninstitute&period;org&sol;policy-analysis&sol;irans-ballistic-missile-programs-and-regional-security<&sol;a><&sol;li>&NewLine;<&sol;ol>&NewLine;

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